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I.  Introduction 
  Three characteristics distinguish the U.S. ready-to-eat (RTE) cereal industry.  First, the industry is 
highly concentrated.  Although there are approximately 40 companies producing more than 400 brands, 
more than 90% of output since 1980 has been produced by just five companies
1.  Another characteristic is 
extensive advertising.  Average selling expenses are 30% of sales value, with smaller firms tending to 
advertise more than large firms.  Moreover, most of this expense is for mass-media advertising.  The third 
distinguishing characteristic of the RTE cereal industry is product proliferation.  New product launches 
have increased from one or two products per year in 1950, to more than 100 per year since 1989.  If one 
accounts for all of the variations in sizes and flavors of the 400 brands, there are approximately 1000 RTE 
cereal products for sale in the U.S.  Private label products, an important source of competition in other 
industries, have limited effect in the RTE cereal industry.  Though they are priced about 40% above 
private label products, branded products continuously capture more than 90% of the market (Connor, 
1999).  
  These attributes tend to facilitate the exercise of either unilateral or cooperative market power, 
and in the past have led U.S. antitrust authorities to closely scrutinize the RTE cereal industry.  The 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), in fact, devoted up to two-thirds of its resources to investigate the 
industry during the Ford and Carter administrations.  The FTC sued the top three manufacturers – 
Kelloggs, General Mills, and Post – for effectively operating as a “shared monopoly”.  However, the 
prosecution was ended abruptly by Congressional action in 1981 (Warner, 1981).   
The objective of this study is to examine both the degree and type of market power that may have 
                                                       
1 These numbers are valid for the RTE cereal industry as a whole.  If the classification is made by individual product (corn flakes, 
for example) the concentration would be still higher.   2 
been exercised by top cereal companies in the years before termination of the “Big Three” case (1975-
1980), and then in the years after termination of the case (1982-1990).  Our hypothesis is that once the 
industry no longer found itself under the spotlight of an on-going governmental investigation, conduct 
became substantially less competitive.  Additionally, we hypothesize that the increase in overall market 
power was driven mainly by a rise in coordinated as opposed to unilateral market power.   
To test these hypotheses, we quantify the conduct of U.S. cereal makers using the differentiated-
products oligopoly framework of Cotterill, Franklin, and Ma (1996).  Their approach provides us with a 
convenient way to parameterize the spectrum of oligopoly outcomes, ranging from perfect collusion to 
perfect rivalry.  The Cotterill, Franklin, and Ma (CFM) approach nests as special cases residual demand 
models that do not enable separation of unilateral from coordinated market power (e.g. Baker and 
Bresnahan, 1985), as well as unilateral demand approaches allowing for only Nash-Bertrand behavior 
(e.g. Hausman, Leonard, Zona, 1994; Nevo, 2001).  As in CFM’s analysis, we employ the Rothschild, 
Chamberlin, and Cotterill indexes to quantify the exercise of different forms of market power.   
Data are from Selling Area Markets Inc. (SAMI), which reported the four-week U.S. average 
price and quantity of approximately 70 cereals sold in supermarkets between 1975 and 1990.  In this stage 
of the paper’s development, we work with 12 brands of the “traditional kid” segment.  This sample 
accounts for 80% of that segment and represents four cereal companies.  
   The paper is organized as follows.  In section II we lay out our conceptual model for addressing 
the issue of market conduct.  In section III the empirical procedures and data used to implement the 
conceptual model are described.  The results are described in section IV, and section V gives our 
conclusions.     3 
 
II.  Conceptual framework 
Models of differentiated products using brand level data have been developed by Baker and 
Bresnahan (1985 and 1988), Hausman, Leonard, and Zona (1994), and Cotterill and Haller (1997).  The 
Baker and Bresnahan approach involves the estimation of residual demands, which can indicate whether 
the demand facing a group of firms is sufficiently inelastic (after accounting for rival behavior) to enable 
the exercise of market power.  In contrast to the residual demand approach, Hausman, Leonard, and Zona, 
and Cotterill and Haller assume Nash-Bertrand conjectures (implying  0 / = ∂ ∂ j i p p   j i   ≠ ∀ ) and estimate 
unilateral demand systems.  For the purposes of this study, each of these frameworks have a key 
limitation.  Specifically, the residual demand approach does not enable separation of unilateral from 
coordinated market power, and the unilateral demand approach allows for only one type of behavior 
(Nash-Bertrand).   
In a 1996 paper, Cotterill, Franklin, and Ma (CFM) developed a framework that does not have 
these limitations.  Their approach allows price reaction elasticities (also known as conjectural variations 
parameters) to be non-zero and vary across brands, and enables the identification of unilateral market 
power separately from that of coordinated market power.  It allows for both perfect collusion and perfect 
competition, and nests the Hausman, Leonard, Zona and Baker and Bresnahan models as special cases.  
CFM use three indexes of market power to decompose the degree of market power arising from collusion 
versus that which arises from unilateral market power.  A less-satisfying feature of the CFM approach is 
that the observed and estimated price reaction elasticities are not consistent in general
2, and a static 
                                                       
2 Inconsistent conjectures are also a feature of the Baker and Bresnahan model.  Hausman, Leonard, and Zona ignore rather than 
resolve the lack of consistency in Nash-Bertrand models (CFM).    4 
framework is used to characterize strategic interaction among firms.  Despite these theoretical 
shortcomings, CFM’s framework has been shown to be empirically tractable, and provides us with a 
convenient way to parameterize the spectrum of oligopoly outcomes.  As such it greatly facilitates 
empirical analysis of pricing and profitability at the brand level.   
For these reasons, we follow CFM’s general framework to examine the issue of market power in 
the RTE cereal industry, although we make two minor modifications.  First of all, we derive the 
expression for optimal markup and the price elasticity of demand from a brand manager’s profit-
maximization problem, instead of a brand’s demand function.  Additionally, we follow a different route to 
derive fully collusive elasticities.  These departures will be explained in more detail below.   
 
Brand manager’s problem 
  The cereal industry is characterized by a small number of firms selling multiple brands.  As such, 
it may be more realistic to consider the profit-max problem of a multi-brand firm (as in Nevo 2001) than 
that of a brand manager who maximizes profits independently of other brand managers in the same firm.  
However, in terms of the optimal markup (i.e. price-cost margin), the only practical difference between 
these approaches is that the multi-brand approach automatically assumes that brands of the same firm 
have price reaction elasticities ( ij ε ) identically equal to 1 (that is, pricing behavior is “fully collusive” 
across brands within a firm).  With the brand-manager approach, price reaction elasticities are determined 
empirically, using observations of actual market behavior, and so may differ from 1.  Viewing this greater 
generality as an advantage, we analyze the profit-max problem from the perspective of an independent 
brand manager.     5 
We begin by assuming that the profit function for a individual brand of cereal – in this case brand 
1 – can be represented as:  
  1 1 1 1 ) ( C q mc p1 − − = Π          ( 1 )  
where 1 p is the price of brand 1,  1 mc is the (constant) marginal cost of brand 1, and  1 C is the fixed cost of 
production.  We assume that the quantity 1 q  produced by firm 1 is dependent on the prices of competing 
brands such that  ) ,..., ( 1 1 1 n p p q q = .  A firm maximizes profit by choosing the price of its brand (i.e. 
Bertrand competition), leading to the first order condition:  










































Multiplying though by  i iq p p ∑ / 1  as well as by  ) / ( 1 1 p p ,  ) / ( 2 2 p p ,  ) / ( n n p p , and  ) / ( 1 1 q q  in 
certain terms leads to the following modified first order condition:  
  [] 0 ) ( 1 1 21 12 11 1 1 1 = + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + + + n n w pcm w ε η ε η η        ( 2 )  
where  1 w  is the expenditure share on brand 1,  1 1 1 1 / ) ( p mc p pcm − =  is the price-cost margin, 
) / )( / ( i j j i ij q p p q ∂ ∂ = η  is the elasticity of demand for brand i with respect to the price of brand j, 
and ) / )( / ( i j j i ij p p p p ∂ ∂ = ε is a price reaction elasticity (i.e. the degree that brand i tends to respond to a 
change in brand j’s price).  Solving for the optimal markup (i.e. price-cost margin) yields
3: 
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The remainder of the analysis focuses on the denominator of the right-hand side of (3), which – 
following CFM – we call the observable own price elasticity of demand (
O




O    
2 1 1 11 1 ε η η η .  Three special cases of 
O
1 η  can be distinguished.  In the Nash-Bertrand case there 
                                                       
3 The optimal markup derived from a multi-brand firm problem would differ only in that the price reaction elasticities would be 1 
for brands of the same firm.  It is not difficult to incorporate this restriction if felt to be important.    6 
is only unilateral market power, since  0 = ij ε for all i and j (i≠  j) and the price elasticity is equal to  11 η  
alone
4.  When there is full collusion among brands (for which we denote the elasticity by 
C
1 η ), all price 
reaction elasticities are one, such that the price elasticity for brand 1 is  ∑ =
n
1 i
C     1 1 η η .  In the case that 
there is there is a perfectly competitive rivalry among brands (for which we denote the elasticity by 
R
1 η ), 
we have that  1 − = ij ε  for all i and j (i≠  j), yielding a price elasticity of  ∑ − =
n
1 i 11
R     1 1 η η η .   
These cases are portrayed in Figure 1.  Note that the fully collusive elasticity (
C
1 η ) corresponds to 
the steepest demand slope in price-quantity space, while that of the competitive rivalry (
R
1 η ) approaches 
the horizontal axis.  Given the market characteristics outlined in the introduction, we would expect that 
the observed own price elasticities (
O
1 η ) will fall somewhere between the unilateral ( 11 η ) and fully 
collusive (
C
1 η ) estimates.   
 
Market conduct indexes 
  While the elasticities described above can characterize the competitive structure of the RTE 
cereal industry, it is helpful to further use a set of standardized indexes to analyze market conduct.  
Following CFM, we employ the Rothschild Index, Cotterill Index, and Chamberlin Quotient to 
decompose total market power into its unilateral and collusive components.   
The Rothschild Index (RI) indicates how close the brand comes to reaching its maximum market 
power (as given by the fully collusive demand elasticity, 
C
1 η ) when it acts unilaterally.  The RI is defined 
as the slope of the unilateral demand divided by the slope of the fully collusive demand.  In the 
neighborhood of the price p1  (see Figure 1), this is equivalent to dividing the fully collusive price 
                                                       
4 This is the underlying assumption of Hausman, Leonard, and Zona; Cotterill and Haller; and Nevo (2001).   7 
elasticity by the unilateral price elasticity:  11 1 η η /       RI
C ≡ , where  ] 1 , 0 [   RI ∈ .  When RI equals zero there 
is perfect competition; when it equals one there is full collusion.   
Assuming again that 
C
1 η  is the maximum market power that could be exerted by a brand, the 
Cotterill Index (CI) indicates the extent to which that theoretical maximum is achieved by the brand.  
The CI is obtained by dividing the fully collusive price elasticity by the observed price elasticity at a 
given price and quantity observation: 
O C/       CI 1 1 η η ≡ , where  ] 1 , 0 [   CI ∈ .  When the CI equals zero there 
is perfect competition or unilateral market power offset by rivalry; when the CI equals one there is 
monopolistic behavior.  
A third index used by CFM is the Chamberlin Quotient (CQ), which is the proportion of the 
observed market power that is not assigned to unilateral power:  ) / ( 1 11 1 η η
O       CQ − ≡  such that 
] 1 , (   CQ −∞ ∈ .  If there is no coordination or rivalry across brands, the CQ is zero (Nash-Bertrand 
conjectures) and the observed price elasticity is identical to the unilateral price elasticity.  With increasing 
degrees of collusion the CQ approaches one.  In the case of competitive rivalry, the CQ becomes 
negative, with a lower bound of (−∞ ).  
 
III.  Empirical framework and data 
  The empirical procedure consists of estimating unilateral ( 11 η ), observed (
O
1 η ) and fully 
collusive (
C
1 η ) elasticities, then using them to calculate the Rothschild Index, Cotterill Index, and 
Chamberlin Quotient for each brand.  This requires a set of own and cross-price elasticities of consumer 
demand ( ij η ), as well as price reaction elasticities ( ij ε ).  In turn, the former requires estimation of a set of 
demand equations, while the latter involves the estimation of price response equations.  We describe these   8 
steps below.   
 
Demand elasticity estimation framework 
  Estimating brand-level elasticities is particularly challenging for an industry in which there are 
hundreds of brands
5.  One method for limiting the number of parameters to be estimated while analyzing 
multiple brands is to employ a multinomial logit model.  Although this approach is appealing for its 
tractability, substitution between products is driven completely by market shares instead of how similar 
the products are.  This poses a particular problem for brand-level analysis in a market with multiple 
segments.  For example, suppose there are two kid cereals, Kid1 and Kid2, and a third, mature adult-
oriented cereal, Health.  If Kid2 and Health have the same share of the overall market, then a logit model 
will restrict the cross-price elasticity of demand with respect to Kid1 to be the same for Kid2 and Health.  
In other words, if the price of kid cereal Kid1 goes up, consumers are assumed to switch towards Health 
by the same amount that they do for Kid2.  Since we would not expect Health to be as good a substitute 
for Kid1 as would Kid2, this feature of the logit model has traditionally made it less appealing for 
analyzing market power in differentiated-product industry
6.   
Recent improvements to the logit model appear to have minimized this shortcoming, however.  
For example, Nevo (2001) developed a generalized version of the logit framework, and used it to estimate 
brand level elasticities for the RTE cereal market
7.  The use of a random-coefficients model allows him to 
avoid the cross-price elasticity problem described above, without having to make assumptions about the 
                                                       
5 The precise number of brands depends on how a brand is defined, as well as the year in question.  
6 CFM, in fact, characterize this feature as a “major flaw” (p. 9). 
7 See the exchange between Timothy Bresnahan and Jerry Hausman regarding Aviv Nevo’s econometric work on the cereal 
industry at the bottom of this web page:  http://www.stanford.edu/~tbres/research.htm   9 
way in which the cereal industry is segmented.  Nevo’s model is still highly restricted (since each brand 
of cereal has the same coefficient on price in the indirect utility function) but he provides very plausible 
elasticity estimates for 25 different cereals.  In particular, all cross-price elasticities are positive (as one 
would intuitively expect), and those corresponding to cereals of the same segment tend to be larger than 
those corresponding to separate segments.  While these results suggest that recent developments in logit 
models are promising, they have yet to be used in price reaction analysis without the Nash-Bertrand 
assumption.  
Another approach for reducing the number of parameters that must be estimated is to use a 
multilevel demand model.  Originally this method was developed to deal with demand for broad 
categories like food, clothing, and housing.  More recently it has been adapted for the analysis of demand 
for differentiated products (Hausman, Leonard and Zona; CFM).  The multilevel demand assumption 
would seem to be consistent with the RTE cereal industry, since research indicates that cereals are 
“spatially” differentiated products that can be grouped into different segments (Schmalensee 1978).  For 
instance, although he does not estimate a multilevel demand model, Nevo (2001) categorizes the cereals 
he analyzes into 4 segments
8.  Segmentation of this type has also been confirmed by professional industry 
analysts.  For example, Cotterill and Haller provide the following quote from Nielsen Marketing Research 
executives on page 2: “The [Taste Enhanced Wholesome] segment consists of brands that possess strong 
interactions with each other.  Including other category segments into the evaluation may ‘dilute’ the 
switching patterns observed in the data.”   
Given the segmentation of the RTE cereal industry, we use the multilevel demand model and 
                                                       
8 The four segments are all family/basic, simple health/nutrition, taste enhanced wholesome, and kids’ cereal.    10 
focus on one segment at a time, which greatly facilitates estimation work.  For the present paper we focus 
exclusively on the “Traditional Kid” segment identified in Cotterill and Haller, because it appears to be 
one of the better defined segments, in terms of the substitutability of brands within it.  (For more on the 
12 brands we included within the Traditional Kid segment, see the “Data” section below.)  We assume 
that brand managers recognize both the segmentation of the cereal market and the multi-stage decision 
process of consumers.   
  We estimate demand elasticities using the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) of Deaton and 
Muellbauer (1980).  AIDS is widely used for demand system analysis because it is flexible, is compatible 
with aggregation over consumers, and is easy to estimate and interpret.  The AIDS model in budget share 
form is:  
  () P x p w i j j ij i i / log log β γ α + + = ∑ ,   ∀ brands i, j 
where wi is the expenditure share on the ith brand, pj is the price of the jth brand, x is total expenditure on 
kids’ cereals, and log P is a general price index.  In the case of the Linear Approximate AIDS model, 
which is estimated in this paper, log P is approximated by what Deaton and Muellbaeur refer to as 
‘Stone’s price index’.  Mathematically this index is:  ∑ = k k p w P    log log .  The theoretical properties of 
adding-up, zero-degree homogeneity of demand functions, and symmetry of cross price effects imply the 
following parametric restrictions:  1 = ∑ i α ,    0 = ∑ i ij γ ,   0 = ∑ i β ,   0 = ∑ j ij γ ,   ji ij γ γ = . 
  Because the data employed in this study is purely time series (which may cause problems with 
serial correlation), we follow Deaton and Muellbauer’s suggestion to use the first differences of the 
variables.  Differentiating the budget share form of the AIDS model and making use of the fact that 
  P x d ) / log(   Q d    log =  (see Barten, 1993, p. 134-135) yields:    11 
  ) log ( log Q d       p d dw i j j ij i β γ + =∑ . 
For estimation purposes the above equation needs to be transformed into finite differences, and needs an 
error term  it u .  The final empirical form of the demand model is then:  
  it t i j jt ij i it u Q p w + + + = ∑ ) log ( ) log( ∆ β ∆ γ α ∆ ,  ∀ brands i,j and periods t .      (4) 
In this equation we define  1 , − − = t i it it w w w ∆ ,  = it p log ∆ ) log( 1 , − − t i it p p , and  = t Q log ∆  
∑ − −
i t i it it q q w ) log( 1 , .  Note that a constant parameter  i α  is included based on general econometric 
practice.  Because the equation is in log differences,  i α  is interpreted as the percentage change in 
expenditure share between time periods.  Own and cross price elasticities are calculated in the LA/AIDS 
model as  i i ii ii w β γ η − + − = ) / ( 1  and  ) / ( ) / ( i j i i ji ij w w w β γ η − =  respectively.   
 
Price reaction estimation framework 
Price reaction equations are deduced by substituting the AIDS demand functions into the brand 
manager’s profit function (1) and (as before) assuming Bertrand price competition.  Because the details of 
CFM’s derivation are lengthy and involved, we refer the reader to their paper instead of repeating the 
derivations here.  The end result is a system of price reaction functions that are logarithmic in prices:  
  ∑ ≠ + =
i j j ij i i p p log log ε θ ,   ∀ brands i, j 
Although these i simultaneous equations appear simple, note that the parameters  i θ  and  ij ε  represent 
complex functions of the model’s structural parameters, due to the incorporation of AIDS functions into 
the profit-maximization framework.  
Estimating the price reaction model involves a number of challenges.  First of all, this is a system 
of simultaneous equations, each of which are unidentified.  Additionally, the data that we use (discussed   12 
below) are purely time series in nature, which makes it difficult to distinguish brand-level pricing 
interactions from supply/demand fluctuations.  With these issues in mind, we use a three-stage least 
squares estimation procedure, and include a one-period lag of the dependent variable as an explanatory 
variable in each equation.  This makes each equation just-identified, since there are n endogenous 
variables in each equation, and n - 1 predetermined variables that are excluded from each equation.  To 
address (in part) the issue of how general supply/demand conditions may affect prices over time, we 
include total expenditure x as an explanatory variable in each equation.  As such, the final empirical form 
of the equations are:  
it t t i lag i j jt ij i it u x p p p + + + + = − ≠ ∑ exp 1 , log log log λ λ ε θ   ∀ brands i,j and periods t        (5) 
Ideally, both the AIDS demand equations and the price reaction functions would be estimated 
together in a large seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) framework, as in CFM, since SUR is 
asymptotically the most efficient procedure.  However, as the number of brands in the analysis increases, 
the size of the equation system increases exponentially, making it much more costly – in terms of degrees 
of freedom as well as computing resources – to undertake three-stage least squares estimation.  Since we 
work with 12 brands, the SUR system would involve 256 coefficients in 23 equations, even with all 
restrictions from demand theory in place.  Attempting this is a topic for a future version of the paper
9.   
Another way to improve estimation would be to include additional exogenous, identifying 
variables in the demand and price reaction models.  Currently both (4) and (5) assume, for example, that 
costs, marketing strategies, demographic patterns, preferences, and the number of competing products are 
constant over the period of estimation.  Variables that could be added include: (a) advertising 
                                                       
9 Note that CFM worked with far fewer brands, such that they never had more than 8 equations in the SUR system.     13 
expenditures / marketing campaigns, (b) the price of raw cereal ingredients (although these are only a 
fraction of selling price), (c) the price of paper used in cereal boxes (another small fraction of selling 
price), and (d) the total number of cereals available in the segment.   
Once we have the estimated set of demand and price reaction elasticities, we: (a) have the 
unilateral elasticity ( 11 η ) that a brand manager theoretically perceives if acting alone, (b) can calculate 
the observed elasticity actually perceived by brand managers using the formula  ∑ + =
n
i i
O    
2 1 1 11 1 ε η η η , 
and (c) can calculate the fully collusive elasticity that would be perceived if price reaction elasticities 
were all 1, using the formula  ∑ =
n
1 i
C     1 1 η η .   
 
Data 
  To estimate equations (4) and (5), we use data from Selling-Area Markets, Inc. (SAMI) covering 
the period January 1975 to November 1990
10.  SAMI observations are at the brand-level, are in dollars 
and pounds for the U.S. market as a whole, and correspond to four-week intervals, such that there are 13 
observations per year.  The average price for a brand is obtained by dividing sales in dollars by sales in 
pounds.  To account for general inflation over time, we deflated the value data using the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics U.S. City Average Food and Beverage Price Index, which is available on their web site.  The 
time series was split into two periods (January 1975 to December 1980, and January 1982 to November 
1990) in order to capture the effects of changes in the regulatory environment (i.e., the termination of the 
FTC “Big Three” case in early 1981).   
  For this paper – which is exploratory at this point – we focus on the ‘Traditional Kids’ cereal 
                                                       
10 November 1990 is the last month for which SAMI published data.    14 
market.  This segment was chosen because it is well-defined in the sense that it is easier to discern 
whether a cereal belongs to this group than it is within the other segments identified in Cotterill and 
Haller (all family/basic, simple health/nutrition, and taste enhanced wholesome).  Traditional kids cereals 
are distinguished by a combination of high sugar content and marketing targeted at kids, in which the 
image of a colorful cartoon character is typically emphasized as opposed to family imagery, or 
health/nutritive properties
11.  For example, Quaker Cap N Crunch is unquestionably a kid cereal, while 
Frosted Flakes is not necessarily so, since it is popular with adults.  The 12 kid cereals included in the 
study account for an average 79% share
12 of the kid segment in the SAMI data from 1975 to 1990.  The 
SAMI data itself accounts for approximately 95% of cereal sales in the U.S.  
 
IV.  Some preliminary results 
During estimation of models (4) and (5), a problem with multicollinearity in the price series was 
encountered.  In particular, the median pair-wise correlation coefficient out of 66 calculated was found to 
be 0.96!  This level of multicollinearity hinders our ability to distinguish brand price interactions from 
general price trends over time.  A problem with positive serial correlation in a number of equations was 
also encountered during early regression runs.  However, making a correction for autocorrelation in the 
econometric software resulted in Durbin-Watson statistics that were approximately 2.0 (the ideal) for 
nearly all of the equations
13.   
                                                       
11 The 12 cereals analyzed are Post Fruity Pebbles, Post Honey Comb, Post Super Golden Crisp, General Mills Cocoa Puffs, 
General Mills Lucky Charms, General Mills Trix, Quaker Cap N Crunch, Quaker Cap N Crunch Berry, Kelloggs Froot Loops, 
Kelloggs Corn Pops, Kelloggs Honey Smacks, and Kelloggs Apple Jacks.  
12 These particular shares are calculated on the basis of pounds of cereal.  Shares in the empirical analysis are on an expenditure 
basis.   
13 We carried out estimation in SHAZAM version 8.  To correct for autocorrelation we used non-linear estimation, which enables 
selection of the ‘auto’ option (see SHAZAM version 8 manual, p. 148).     15 
 
Price elasticities of demand 
Because of space constraints, it is not possible to report the cross-price elasticities of demand for 
either of the two time periods.  (These are used to calculate the observed and fully collusive price 
elasticities, which are described below.)  In general there is little to report except that, while we might 
expect all cross-price elasticities to be positive (since brands should be substitutes for each other), there 
were a substantial number of negative cross-price elasticities.  This may have been because we burdened 
the estimation framework with too many brands (12 in total).  Nevo (2000a) states that the multi-stage 
AIDS framework works well for a small number of brands, but “as the number of brands in each segment 
increase beyond a handful, this method becomes less feasible” (p. 545).  Own-price elasticities, which 
represent unilateral market power, are discussed below.  
 
Price reaction elasticities 
As with the cross-price elasticities, for lack of space it is not possible to display the price-reaction 
elasticities, which indicate the degree to which one brand’s price is changed as the price of another 
changes.  These are generated for the purpose of calculating the observed own-price elasticties, and we 
describe those below.   
 
Elasticities perceived by brands 
  Table 1 presents the own price elasticities which are later used to calculate indexes concerning 
the type and degree of market power exhibited by brands.  The second and third columns of Table 1   16 
report the fully collusive price elasticities, which are calculated using the formula  ∑ =
n
1 i
C     1 1 η η .  In brief, 
the fundamental finding was that the fully collusive elasticities on average changed little across the two 
time periods.  
Own-price elasticities reflect market power under purely unilateral behavior, and are reported in 
columns four and five of Table 1.  Those for 1975-1980 are reported in column four, and range from –
0.89 for Honey Comb to –7.62 for Super Golden Crisp (with the exception of Trix, which is slightly 
positive).  Own-price elasticities for the second period are reported in the fifth column, and range from –
3.23 in the case of Apple Jacks to –8.17 in the case of Super Golden Crisp.  The key result is that there is 
notably higher price sensitivity in the second period, which suggests that consumers lost loyalty to 
particular brands.  This may be related to the rapid entry of new cereals between the periods of the study.   
Columns six and seven of Table 1 present the own-price elasticities that brand managers actually 
observed in each time period, calculated with the formula  ∑ + =
n
i i
O    
2 1 1 11 1 ε η η η .  Entries in these two 
columns with an asterisk (*) indicate that collusion was occurring because the demand curve perceived by 
a brand manager is more inelastic than the demand curve that would have been perceived unilaterally.  
Entries with no asterisk indicate that a brand is involved in competitive rivalry.  Looking at the period 
during the FTC case, only 4 brands appear to have behaved collusively.  However, after the case was 
dropped, 6 of the brands exhibited collusive behavior (only two exhibited collusive behavior in both of 
the periods).  Two of the observed own price elasticities were extremely elastic in the first period 
(including –75.35 for Trix), suggesting that behavior was essentially competitive (Table 2).  The few 
entries that are positive (Honey Comb, Cap N Crunch, Cap N Crunch Berry, and Honey Smacks), are due 
to exceptionally large price reaction elasticities estimated for some brands.     17 
 
Indexes of market behavior 
  Tables 2 through 4 are the results of central interest, and correspond to the indexes of market 
power described in Section II above.  These indexes allow us to determine (i) the degree to which brands 
exercised market power before and after the termination of the FTC case, (ii) the type of market power 
that may have been exercised (unilateral versus collusive), and (iii) whether there was change in the 
above two characteristics once the FTC dropped its case in the early 1981.   
  Table 2 presents the Rothschild index for each of 12 brands for both periods.  The index, defined 
as  11 1 η η /       RI
C ≡ , measures the degree of unilateral market power held by a firm.  Post Fruity Pebbles, 
for example, had sufficient product differentiation to exercise unilateral pricing power equivalent to 29 
percent of the pricing power it would have if it jointly managed all 12 cereal brands, during the 1975-
1980 period.  This pricing power fell to 16 percent during the 1982-1990 period.  All but two estimates 
are between 0 (perfect competition) and 1 (monopoly), as the theory predicts
14.  Three of them, namely 
Honey Comb, Cocoa Puffs, and Cap N Crunch Berry, effectively have unilateral market power equivalent 
to what is possible with the joint managing of all brands.    
For 10 of the 12 brands, unilateral pricing power fell over the period in which the FTC dropped 
its case.  For example, the unilateral pricing power of Cap N Crunch Berry fell from 88 percent to 19 
percent.  These results are generally not explained by any change in collusive market power among the 
brands (Table 1, columns two and three).  Instead, these results are due to the fact that unilateral own 
price elasticities became much more elastic in the second period of the study (Table 1, columns four and 
                                                       
14 Two cases are outside the unit interval. In the case that the index is greater than 1 (Honey Comb), unilateral market power was 
effectively stronger than collusive. In the case that the index is negative (Trix), the own price elasticity was positive.     18 
five).  One explanation is that new product introduction in the industry during this period led consumers 
to be more price sensitive.  This “flattening” of the demand curve reduced the ability of brands to exercise 
market power unilaterally.   
  Table 3 presents the Cotterill index of total market power, defined as 
O C/       CI 1 1 η η ≡ .  This 
indicates the degree of combined unilateral and collusive pricing power possessed by a brand.  In each of 
the two periods, 9 of 12 brands had the ability to exercise coordinated market power (i.e. had non-
negative values).  While in the majority of cases this pricing power appears quite moderate, the third 
column of Table 3 indicates that 8 of 12 brands saw an increase in total market power after the FTC 
dropped its case.  This is the result of central interest in our study.  Since Table 1 shows that in most cases 
brands had less unilateral market power in 1982-1990 than in 1975-1980 (columns four and five), the 
increase in total power must have been due to a rise in the ability to exercise coordinated market power.   
  Examination of Table 4 indicates that this is indeed the case for most of the brands.  This table 
presents the Chamberlin quotient of collusive market power, which is calculated as  ) / ( 1 11 1 η η
O       CQ − ≡ , 
and quantifies the proportion of market power that is collusive as opposed to unilateral.  Interestingly, for 
7 of 12 brands during 1975-1980, the CQ was negative, indicating that there was competitive rivalry 
among the brands.  This continued to be a feature during the 1982-1990 period, as 6 of the 12 brands were 
in a state of competitive rivalry, though to less of a degree than before.  The third column indicates that 
for 8 of 12 brands, the degree of coordinated market power rose after the FTC dropped its case.  Two of 
the four brands that did not experience an increase in collusive market power (Trix and Corn Pops), did 
experience an increase in unilateral power, however.  This explains why the total market power for 8 of 
the 12 brands was higher in the 1982-1990 period than it was in the 1975-1980 period (Table 3).     19 
V.  Summary and preliminary conclusions 
The U.S. ready-to-eat (RTE) cereal industry is highly concentrated, engages in extensive 
advertising, and continually introduces new varieties of cereal.  These attributes are consistent with the 
exercising of either unilateral or cooperative market power, and in the 1970s led the FTC to prosecute the 
three largest U.S. cereal makers as a “shared monopoly”.  The “Big Three” case, however, was ended 
abruptly by Congressional action in 1981.  This study examines the degree and type of market power that 
may have been exercised prior to and following the termination of the case.  Our hypothesis is that once 
the industry no longer found itself under the spotlight of an on-going governmental investigation, conduct 
became substantially less competitive.  Additionally, we hypothesize that the increase in overall market 
power was driven mainly by a rise in coordinated as opposed to unilateral market power.  We investigate 
these issues with the differentiated-products oligopoly framework of Cotterill, Franklin, and Ma (1996), 
and time-series SAMI data on sales of traditional kids cereals for the periods 1975-1980 and 1982-1990.  
  In preliminary results we find that while unilateral market power was exercised before and after 
termination of the “Big Three” case, it was lower during the latter period, since consumer own-price 
elasticities became much more elastic.  The decline in the power of brands may have been due to the rapid 
introduction of competing products.  With regard to pricing interaction among the 12 kids cereals, the 
number of brands engaged in competitive rivalry equaled the number of brands engaged in collusion 
during the FTC case.  After termination of the case, however, the competitive rivalries generally 
weakened, and collusive behavior became more prevalent.  Since the overall rise in collusive power 
outweighed the fall in unilateral power, these initial results ultimately suggest that total market power 
increased following termination of the FTC case.      20 
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Note: The linear demand curves for brand 1 are for illustrative purposes only; in the analysis no restrictions are placed on the 
shape of the demand curves.  Only the value of the elasticity at a single point (p1, q1) is used, which corresponds to a brand’s 
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Table 1.  Own price elasticities under full collusion, pure unilateral power, and what is observed 
 Full  collusion  Unilateral  Observed 
 1975-1980  1982-1990  1975-1980  1982-1990  1975-1980  1982-1990 
Post Fruity Pebbles  -0.80  -0.87  -2.74  -5.39  -9.89  -6.42 
Post Honey Comb  -1.10  -0.84  -0.89  -7.20  -0.98  1.33* 
Post Super Golden Crisp  -1.65  -0.99  -7.62  -8.17  -9.01  -4.85* 
General Mills Cocoa Puffs  -1.25  -0.64  -1.45  -4.83  -12.11  27.64* 
General Mills Lucky Charms  -0.98 -0.78 -1.85 -7.75  -43.52  -10.19 
General Mills Trix  -1.25  -0.75  0.25  -6.92  -75.35  -6.63* 
Quaker Cap N Crunch  -1.14  -1.38  -2.42  -4.98  1.33*  -4.05* 
Quaker Cap N Crunch Berry  -1.04 -1.23 -1.17 -6.47 0.36*  -19.86 
Kelloggs Froot Loops  -0.68  -1.04  -2.34  -8.02  -5.58  -8.77 
Kelloggs Corn Pops  -0.74  -1.25  -3.46  -4.13  3.57*  -21.30 
Kelloggs Honey Smacks  -0.83  -1.11  -3.33  -5.78  -1.22*  19.46* 
Kelloggs Apple Jacks  -0.60  -1.08  -1.17  -3.23  -6.10  -3.65 
* In the two rightmost columns, the asterisk indicates that collusion is occuring because demand curve observed by 
brand manager is more inelastic than the demand curve that would be perceived unilaterally.  Entries with no 
asterisk indicate the opposite is happening; that is, a brand is engaged in competitive rivalry. 
 
 
Table 2.  Rothschild index of unilateral market power 
 1975-1980  1982-1990  Change in potential 
unilateral power 
Post Fruity Pebbles  0.29  0.16  − 
Post Honey Comb  1.24  0.12  − 
Post Super Golden Crisp  0.22  0.12  − 
General Mills Cocoa Puffs  0.86  0.13  − 
General Mills Lucky Charms  0.53 0.10  − 
General Mills Trix  -4.97  0.11  + 
Quaker Cap N Crunch  0.47  0.28  − 
Quaker Cap N Crunch Berry  0.88 0.19  − 
Kelloggs Froot Loops  0.29  0.13  − 
Kelloggs Corn Pops  0.21  0.30  + 
Kelloggs Honey Smacks  0.25  0.19  − 
Kelloggs Apple Jacks  0.51  0.33  − 
Note: In theory this index runs from zero (perfect competition) to one (monopoly).  In the one case where the index 
is greater than 1, unilateral market power was stronger than collusive.  In the one case where the index is negative, it 
is because the own-price elasticity is positive (an unexpected result).    24 
Table 3.  Cotterill index of observed total market power (both unilateral and collusive) 
 1975-1980  1982-1990  Change in exercise of 
total market power 
Post Fruity Pebbles  0.08  0.14  + 
Post Honey Comb  1.12  -0.63  − 
Post Super Golden Crisp  0.18  0.20  + 
General Mills Cocoa Puffs  0.10  -0.02  − 
General Mills Lucky Charms  0.02 0.08  + 
General Mills Trix  0.02  0.11  + 
Quaker Cap N Crunch  -0.86  0.34  + 
Quaker Cap N Crunch Berry  -2.88 0.06  + 
Kelloggs Froot Loops  0.12  0.12  − 
Kelloggs Corn Pops  -0.21  0.06  + 
Kelloggs Honey Smacks  0.68  -0.06  − 
Kelloggs Apple Jacks  0.10  0.30  + 
Note: In theory this index runs from 0 (perfect competition) to 1 (monopolistic behavior).  If the index is less than 0, 
then own price elasticity is positive.  If the index is greater than 1, then observed market power is stronger than it is 




Table 4.  Chamberlin quotient of collusive market power 
 1975-1980  1982-1990  Change in exercise of 
collusive market power 
Post Fruity Pebbles  -2.61  -0.19  + 
Post Honey Comb  -0.10  1.18  + 
Post Super Golden Crisp  -0.18  0.41  + 
General Mills Cocoa Puffs  -7.35  6.72  + 
General Mills Lucky Charms  -22.46 -0.31  + 
General Mills Trix  301.39  0.04  − 
Quaker Cap N Crunch  1.55  0.19  − 
Quaker Cap N Crunch Berry  1.31 -2.07  − 
Kelloggs Froot Loops  -1.38  -0.09  + 
Kelloggs Corn Pops  2.03  -4.16  − 
Kelloggs Honey Smacks  0.63  4.36  + 
Kelloggs Apple Jacks  -4.20  -0.13  + 
Note: If between 0 and 1, there is collusion.  If the quotient is negative, there is competitive rivalry.  